their own bodies of literature, in the West as well as in the countries of the former Warsaw Bloc and the former Soviet Union 2 .
Explaining the phenomenon of history as an instrument in the service of politics and translating the corresponding terminology from Slavic languages give rise to certain problems. They do not concern linguistic issues, but rather historical circumstances in Central and Eastern Europe after World War II. In its rendition in English, this phenomenon is often referred to as 'historical politics' 3 or 'politics of history' 4 and it appears to be equivalent to the Russian term istoricheskaya politika and the Polish term polityka historyczna.
The term 'politics of history' came to intellectual life from German-speaking countries (ger. Geschichtspolitik) at the end of the 19 th century, but is associated mostly with the post-war German experience. 5 In the last two decades, the German socio-political discourse has employed the term Geschichtspolitik along with Vergangenheitsbewältigung (working through the past) and Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit (dealing with the past). 6 Western contemporary discourse uses the term politics of history to cover a broad range of topics related to the history of ideas, intellectual life and culture, but also the 'historical memory'. 7 I used the term 'politics of history' instead of 'politics of memory' in order to underline the institutional nature of the Soviet politics towards East European Communist Regimes.
This new fi eld of activity in the region of East-Central Europe -'politics of history'attained an unusual popularity at the close of the 20 th century and especially in the 21 st century, when it came to play an ever more signifi cant role in these countries' domestic and foreign policy. One popular view holds that the active role played by state actors in creating structures responsible for carrying out 'politics of history', in marking out specifi c directions for research and in creating narratives about themselves, is unique to East-Central European nation-states. 8 Without going into too much detail about this ongoing debate, as it will not be the subject of the present article, I would like to propose a modest thesis. Namely, that one of the most vivid instances of 'politics of history' articulated and carried out in an institutional sense -i.e., by creating the proper structures and mechanisms of oversight for such a project -was the 'politics of history' of the Soviet Union concerning the countries of the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War.
The present article is part of a larger research project dedicated to the relationship between history and politics in communist Poland, carried out through the L. & A. Birkenmajer Institute for the History of Science of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Currently, a publication of documents from Russian archives on Polish-Soviet relations in the era of Nikita Khru\ shchev is being prepared. I have been working on this topic for several years, carrying out queries in the Russian Federal Archives. In the 2017-2018 academic year, thanks to a Fulbright Grant, I carried out this project and broadened its scope to include other Slavic counties of the Eastern Bloc, at the University of California, Berkeley, and at Stanford University's Hoover Institute.
This article focuses on the problems of Soviet 'politics of history' in the Eastern Bloc in 1945-1989 by the example of selected Slavic countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. The Yugoslavian case is beyond my scholarly interest because of the specifi c relationship which was apparent between the USSR and Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in that period, in particular between 1948 and . The Yugoslavian case could arguably set the parameters for another discussion of history in much of Europe -the idea of a 'national path' to socialism was strongly linked to Tito, and his split with Stalin was rooted in a different interpretation of the Red Army's historical role in the liberation of Yugoslavia. It is within this context the work of Yannis Sygkelos drew attention to the Bulgarian case based on 'Marxist nationalism'. 9 However, it would not be the subject of the present article.
The time period defi ned in the title refers to the period when the Kremlin began to implement measures aimed not only at controlling politics, but also the academia and scholarships of countries included into the Soviet sphere of infl uence. The period ends with the fall of the Communist regimes in East Central Europe in 1989.
Actions aimed at the history of Slavic countries were sanctioned by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (hereafter CC AUCP (b)) and, from 1952, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (hereafter CPSU), and inspired and subsequently implemented in accordance with the interests of the State and the Communist Party of the USSR, thus constituting a signifi cant element of its 'politics of history'. I intend to try and fi nd an answer to the following question: what was the mechanism of Kremlin's control over Polish, Czechoslovakian and Bulgarian historical disciplines and implementing the decisions? However, my research does not include the content of undertaken research and studies as well as the possibility of its realization.
Research conducted
The issue of relationship with and dependence on Moscow in the sphere of academia and historical science are a topic that still has not been recognized as a subject for studies. This is explained by the fact that authors working on the issues of academia under communism 10 have based their research predominantly on the materials available in their own countries and have not taken into account the post-Soviet and post-Party database of documents. An exception to this tendency is represented by a few works of American researchers specializing in Soviet times. 11 I have spent nearly two decades researching post-Soviet archives in Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia. Access to the documentation in some post-Soviet countries is particularly diffi cult because of bureaucratic inertia and the political control over use of materials. Good examples of the risks facing researchers are the cases of mine and one of my close associates and friends, Professor Henryk Głębocki; that historian was detained and expelled from Russia in December 2017 in 'retaliation' for the removal from Poland of a Russian historian accusing of having ties with Russian intelligence. 12 On 14 th September 2012 the Belarusian police confi scated all copies of the fi rst edition of the Belarusian translation of my book titled Sovietization of the Soviet Belarus. 1944 Belarus. -1953 , which was released jointly by the Institute for Historical Research on Belarus in Vilnius and the Belarusian Historical Society in Białystok. The subsequent edition of the book was published by an underground publishing house.
In my previous publications I analyzed Moscow's 'politics of history' in formal and institutional spheres. Soviet realities and the specifi c nature of source materials drove me to focus primarily on the activities of the highest party-state authorities, which were represented by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR. However, my previous studies covering the problem of power and scholarship relations in post-war Poland were largely limited to research within Polish borders. 13 My current study is based largely on materials from four Russian federal archives that contain offi cial documents of Soviet authorities and Communist Party of the USSR. Party documents that are stored in the Russian State Archive of the Socio-Political History (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsialno-politicheskoi istorii -RGASPI) and in the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii -RGANI) constitute the primary source for the study of the Soviet politics of history towards Slavic countries. Due to guidelines, analysis and problem-solving mechanisms contained in them, these documents are of inestimable factual value for understanding the extent and nature of Soviet state apparatus functioning in relation to People's democracy countries.
In addition to Party documents, the collections of the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk -ARAN) are of great signifi cance for this research topic. For the purposes of this study, the ARAN documents were juxtaposed with Party documents, which showed their fundamental difference. While the Party documents often depict desired reality, the ARAN documents often present a more realistic picture, which makes them particularly valuable. 11 E.K. Valkenier, Stalinizing Polish Historiography: What Soviet Archives Disclose, "East European Politics and Societies" vol. 7, 1993, no. 1, p. 109-134; J. Connelly, Captive University: The Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish Higher Education, 1945 , Chapel Hill 2000 P. Babiracki, Soviet Soft Power in Poland. Culture and the Making of Stalin's New Empire, 1943-1957 1945 -1964 , Warszawa 2016 I also used the collections of the State Archive of the Russian Federation (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii -GARF), which stores the materials of the USSR state institutions and so-called social organizations of cultural and educational nature. At an early stage of the introduction of the Soviet institutional and methodological model to East European countries, these institutions played a supporting role to the organs of Party authorities.
During my stay in the USA, I used documents from the Hoover Archives which hold a number of signifi cant collections relating to Soviet history. Particularly valuable for me were the microfi lms from the archives of the Communist Party of the USSR. Hoover's holdings on the Soviet state and Communist Party apparatus are available on almost 12000 microfi lm reels. 14 Those documents came to the Hoover Archives because of joint microfi lming and digitization projects from the early 1990s. The original documents are housed in Russian archives.
As a matter of fact, I was surprised and had a very positive experience working in the Hoover Archives. I was also impressed with working conditions at Hoover: relatively fast paging of materials, modern equipment, few restrictions on copying of documents, and, most of all, friendly and competent professional assistance.
Wide-ranging archival search in the collections of four Russian federal archives and the Hoover Archives was undertaken in order to compare the sources from various levels of the decision-making process -from the highest to the operational. This approach made it possible to trace the complicated procedure of Soviet authority operations, starting with information gathering, continuing with its examination and guidelines creation by the experts, and ending with the practical implementation of Moscow's decisions towards the selected East European historical discipline.
The dispersion of functions related to the implementation of Soviet politics of history among various governmental organs, politicized and bureaucratized access to archival materials, and an extremely broad nature of undertaken investigation greatly complicated the research advancement. Arriving at fi ndings in this case went through a path fraught with diffi culties and methodological pitfalls, since no information guides can provide you with knowledge on how to navigate intricate and winding roads of Russian bureaucracy and extremely rich, but often scattered archival collections.
The wide range of research contributed to the narrowing of the narrative down to topics that can illuminate the Kremlin's policy in the most evident and interesting way. First, I analyzed the activity of individual cells of the central apparatus of the USSR Communist Party, the ones that had initiated and supervised the implementation of guidelines in the fi eld of history. A special role in the process of collecting and analyzing the situation in Eastern Bloc was played by the Soviet diplomatic missions, which also performed an additional role of a satellite transmitting the directives from the Kremlin to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.
Secondly, I attempted to demonstrate the role of specialized scientifi c institutions that were established by the CC CPSU with the aim to exercise substantive control over re-search directions and the content in a particular historical discipline. A separate topic is the 'Party' discipline of history in the above-listed countries and its institutions of educational and propaganda nature in the context of their relations with Moscow. This is a research area that still awaits a thorough and in-depth analysis.
In order to understand the Soviet vision of history -the one that Moscow tried to impose onto its satellites -it is crucial to understand the role that Joseph Stalin played in its creation. He personally shaped the institutional foundations of the discipline of history in the USSR and developed specifi c interpretations of the past, in particular the Soviet Pact with Nazi Germany. 15 The enormous collections of documents stored in Soviet archives were to help in building the vision of relations with Eastern Bloc countries desired by the Kremlin. Proper selection of these documents and their usage in joint projects of published edited collections were to shape the vision of the past that was designated from above. To fulfi ll this task, the authorities resorted to complicated manipulations both in terms of texts selection and direct interference with their content.
Institutions
In the USSR and its satellite People's Democracies, state control over scholarly research was predicated on a handful of developed bureaucratic structures, each of which played a specifi c role. At the top of power and of the Party hierarchy was the Central Committee of the AUCP (b)/CPSU, which carried out, fi rst and foremost, functions associated with state control over the life of society, and, secondly, matters of Party ideology and propaganda.
Irrespective of the changing forms and methods of political guardianship in successive periods, the problem of scholarly research always remained at the center of attention and under strict control of the Party. In sometimes less, sometimes more apparent ways, the CC AUCP (b)/CPSU continually exerted its infl uence on the organization of research and on research institutions. The basic tenets of Party control over research in the USSR were formed in the 1930s and functioned with little revision well into the postwar period. It was during this time that the Sovietization of the historical discipline was carried out in the USSR.
In the postwar period, issues pertaining to research lay within the purview of various organizational cells of the Central Committee. While they changed their structures and their names, and while they folded themselves into larger bureaucratic units or dirempted themselves from units as discrete and independent bureaucratic bodies, they nevertheless succeeded in managing virtually all aspects of scholarly research activities. We can list off just a few of these units: CC Department of Science and Culture (Otdel Nauki i Kulturi) , CC Department of Science and Educational Institutions (Otdel nauki i vysshih uchebnih zavedeniy). Rapid and wide scale reorganizations tied to de-Stalinization lasted until 1965. In later years, however, the structures of the central Party apparatus related to control over research no longer saw the organizational shifts of the Khrushchev era and remained more or less unchanged for the duration of the Party's existence. 16 These departments were tasked with organizing research parties and festivities, with monitoring the content of historical publications (both those printed in the USSR and those printed abroad but deemed to be relevant to the USSR's 'national interest'), and with noting the proceedings of congresses and conferences for historians in the countries of the 'socialist community.' It was here that texts were prepared for international congresses and colloquia, that the basic schemas of historical interpretation were decided, that a historian's relationship to the Party was ascertained -and this relationship was obligatory for the purpose of assessing specifi c historical fi gures. These departments were where it was determined, for instance, whether or not Tomas Masaryk was a 'progressive' historical actor. 17 Apart from the Department of Science in all its incarnations and organizational forms, there was one more organizational unit of the Communist Party apparatus that played a hugely signifi cant role in matters concerning the politics of historical scholarship in the Warsaw Pact countries. This was the Department of Foreign Politics (Otdel vneshney politiki) . In its formation as Department of Foreign Politics, which began functioning in April, 1946, seventeen sections were formed, one of which was the Section of Balkan and Slavic Countries.
After the death of J. Stalin and the reorganization of the Party apparatus that followed, a department named The Department for Liaison with Foreign Communist Parties (Otdel po svyazyam s inostrannimi kommunisticheskimi partiyami), was called into existence. Specifi c countries were assembled on the basis of their loyalty to the USSR. Poland and Czechoslovakia were assembled into a section named Sector of European Countries of People's Democracies (Sektor evropeyskih stran narodnoy demokratii). Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Albania were assembled into their own, separate section. Of note is the fact that, up until October 1, 1955 -i.e. the moment of the 'thaw' of its relations with the USSR -Yugoslavia found itself in the same section as France, Italy, and other capitalist countries. 18 Anticommunist and national-liberation movements in Poland and Hungary in 1956 forced the Party leadership of the USSR to develop more sophisticated and effective methods for ensuring their control over these countries. To this end, 1957 saw the replacement of the above departments with two new ones: The Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries (Otdel po kontaktam s kommunisticheskimi i rabochimi partiyami sotsialisticheskih stran), which oversaw all the countries of the Eastern Bloc, and The International Department (Mezhdunarodnyi otdel), which included all capitalist countries of the world and developing countries. 19 The Party assigned an exceptionally broad set of competencies and duties to the 'socialist' department. They received documents from various governing bodies: memos and reports from Soviet embassies, consulates, research institutes, as well as reports from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, but also other kinds of reports. Issues pertaining to 'politics of history' were by no means among minor concerns of this department. In fact, it was here that academic works mentioning Eastern Bloc political activists were censored. Likewise, it was here that decisions were made about the composition of specifi c editorial boards responsible for historical surveys such as the 'The History of Poland', 'The History of Czechoslovakia', 'The History of Bulgaria', etc.
The Overseas Department, dealing with all countries outside the Eastern Bloc, was also the home for expert panels conducting analyses on current events or writing directives and recommendations for solving specifi c problems. In a sense, this department functioned as an independent center for analysis, separate from other Soviet special services, and endowed with resources and materials provided by the institutes of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
The Academy of Sciences of the USSR functioned as the secondary bureaucratic level of control by the Communist Party over historical science and research. Particular departments of the Communist Party were in direct contact with the Presidium of the AS-USSR and its institutions. The academic research elites of the USSR were directly integrated into the structures of Party rule. In the USSR, a particular kind of nationalized and militarized model of relations existed between political and academic elites.
The breadth and depth of cadre politics testifi es to the immense dependence of Soviet academic research on structures of rule and governance. These cadre politics involved everything from the vetting of candidates for leadership positions in research institutions to approving candidates for doctoral studies in the Institute of Slavic Studies of the AS-USSR, whose dissertation projects had to be approved by the Department of Science of the CC CPSU. While appointing a person to a directorial position in a given research institution lay within the purview of lower units of Party rule, even this action had necessitated the acceptance of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 20 The above-mentioned Institute of Slavic Studies of the AS-USSR was called into existence on the basis of a decision of the Politburo of the CC AUCP (b) on August 31, 1946. 21 This institute was built upon the framework of the AS-USSR and various intellectuals, and the Party's relationship to it was completely utilitarian. The knowledge and competencies of its workers were used to realize current political tasks and to solve problems related to 'Slavic issues'. 22 of expanding its plane of existence and its sphere of infl uence in the years immediately following World War II. It was at this time that the Party undertook its fi rst attempts to reconstruct the historical disciplines in the Slavic countries of East-Central Europe in its own Soviet image. National academies of science were created in Eastern Bloc states on the Soviet model, within which institutes and workshops were built from the ground up. Moscow sought out 'progressive' historians in these countries, while the Institute of Slavic Studies of the AS-USSR was to become the coordinating center for methodological revolutions carried out in these countries' research activities. The fundamental project of writing these countries' histories became the fi eld in which the effi cacy of institutional contacts was put to the test.
The Institute of Slavic Studies of the AS-USSR, along with the Institute of the History of the USSR, was its own kind of laboratory: in close cooperation with specifi c institutes and with the CC CPSU, they worked to develop a Soviet vision of the history of Slavic countries. Research workers of the institute often played the role of experts and analysts, ready to attend to the needs of the Department of Science of the CC CPSU with any issues related to Slavic countries. The majority of shared projects within the discipline of history were carried out under the academic patronage of the Institute. Moreover, the Institute was a vehicle for Polish, Czechoslovakian, and Bulgarian research trips to the USSR.
In 1947, the Academy of Science of the USRR on the Old Square (headquarters of the CC CPSU -the symbol for the Party apparatus), was tasked with writing as quickly as possible a Marxist synthesis of the works of Slavic countries, in which the central idea was to be the vanguard role played by Russia and the Soviet Union in uniting all Slavs. The Stalin-Tito confl ict, which in fact had severed all relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia and had led to a fi erce confrontation, by this narrative was the gravedigger of Moscow's plans for East-Central Europe, having leeched the energies of the 'new Slavic movement.'
The idea of writing a history of the Slavic peoples also changed signifi cantly when work on histories of the three Slavic countries (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria) was commenced in 1948. Notably, it was around this same time work was being carried out in the regional offi ces in Kiev and Minsk aimed at creating a Party-approved, Marxist history of two other 'associated' Slavic nations -the Ukrainians and the Belarusians. 23 Finally, the three-tome The History of Poland was published in 1954-58, 24 the twotome The History of Bulgaria appeared in 1954-55, 25 and the three-tome The History of Czechoslovakia in 1956-60, 26 The two-tome History of Yugoslavia was not to see the light of day until 1963. 27 The CC CPSU's constant political supervision of these undertakings is the best measure of the meaning and signifi cance of the Soviet project of writing a canonical account of the history of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. The Party's academic patronage of the project coursed through the Institute of Slavic Studies of the AS-USSR, where in the 1950s researchers sculpted a unique conception and canonization scheme of the works of Slavic countries. In 1968, the Institute broadened the scope of its research activities to include Balkan countries, functioning until 1991 as the Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies. In the 1970s, the Institute returned to its project of general histories of the entire region of East-Central Europe, reacting in this way to the needs of Marxist scholarship at the time. One major expression of this trend were publications dedicated to the topic of the region's political upheavals in 19 th century. 28 Every visit of Soviet delegations to the Slavic countries of the Eastern Bloc was sanctioned by the CC-CPSU, while historians could always expect to receive specifi c instructions for their work and to remain in constant contact with the Soviet embassy. Documentary materials from these visits were sent not only to the Presidium of the AS-USSR, but also to the Central Committee; it was in the CC that decisions were made as to researchers' subsequent tasks and assignments. It is thus possible to claim that these actions were both inspired and realized in accordance with the interests of the State and the Communist Party of the USSR, functioning as one of many moving parts in this country's 'politics of history' apparatus.
In the case of late modern history, and the history of the USSR and of the international communist movement in particular, the Department of Science played a key role across its many organizational forms, formulating guidelines for historians, academic research centers, and academic presses. In the case of the history of the Communist Party and the Comintern, contacts between the historical study of the Party and the task of evaluation were carried out with the help of research workers in the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute. Their analyses and insights about signifi cant historical eras and problems functioned as a sort of Decalogue of Soviet historical sciences; it was through these structure of institutional cooperation that they were realized in actual historical scholarship.
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria saw the formation of analogous institutions, these ones dedicated to the history of leftwing and communist movements. These institutes were the following: in Poland the Wydział Historii Partii ( The tertiary level of Party control over historical scholarship and implementation of the Soviet interpretation of history in Slavic countries involved so-called social organizations, which concerned themselves largely with disseminating propaganda about history. Among these we can list the VOKS (Vsesoiuznoe Obshchestvo Kul'turnoi Sviazi s zagranitsei -All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries), Sovinformburo (Sovetskoye informatsionnoye byuro -Soviet Information Bureau) and the Slavic Committee (Slavianskii komitet). Here, we will pause for a moment to consider this last one.
The deft exploitation of the slogans and mottos of Slavic identity, the manipulation of historical events to correspond to the 'perennial Slavic-Germanic confl ict,' and a fairly broad, for the time, sense of support for any and all notions of cooperation and mutual recognition among Slavs in intellectual circles -these strategies helped to ensure that these themes became the foundation for broad propaganda message disseminated across East-Central Europe in the years immediately following the war. Slogans of a Slavic revival fell onto particularly fertile social ground, fi nding supporters even in academic environments.
The organizational work involved in building a 'new Slavic movement' was overseen by the CC AUCP(b). Apart from the Kremlin-inspired All-Slavic Committee, in 1942 a publication called 'Slaviane' began to be published. Its fi rst editorial board was composed of the Russian Nikolai Derzhavin, the Czech Zdeněk Nejedlý, the Polish Wanda Wasilewska, the Serbian Božidar Moslarić, as well as the Ideological Secretary for the CC BCP(b) -the Belarusian Timofei Gorbunov. The committee was tasked with popularizing the idea of a union of Slavic nations, in clarifying the role and meaning of the USSR in strengthening the independence and wellbeing of Slavic countries. Further issues of 'Slaviane' were to be translated into Polish, Serbian, Czech, and Bulgarian. In accordance with Moscow's directives, the Slavic 'people's democracies' saw their own national Slavic committees assembled.
As a result of the Tito-Stalin split at the end of the 1940s, the meaning and functions of the Slavic Committee's research contacts with the Slavic countries of the Eastern Bloc diminished, while the very idea of 'Slavic unity' began to lose popularity. The Sovietization of the countries of East-Central Europe came to be realized by other means and through other propaganda techniques. The Slavic Committee was fi nally disbanded in 1962, its functions absorbed into the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace.
Mechanisms of Decision-Making
Now, let us try to recount the mechanisms of decision-making related to historical scholarship at the peak of political power in Moscow as well as the implementation of these decisions down the line in the Slavic countries of the Eastern Bloc. We will do this on the basis of both my own original research and using existing literature, and the answer will be by no means simple: this was an extremely complicated process.
Arriving from various sources, information would either arrive in the hands of specifi c secretaries of the CC CPSU, or pass through the Fourth European Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. In either case, it would have already been subjected to multiple levels of analysis over the course of its journey. Moreover, a specifi c manner of taking care of business applied in the case of materials acquired through the Soviet embassies in Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Bulgaria -which often had the character of 'reports.' Before any fi nal decision was made, the given problem had to pass through several levels of decision-makers and experts.
In Eastern Bloc countries, the ambassador of the USSR played a role which was not so much representative, but which rather resembled the dignities enjoyed by a governor or viceroy. This was especially true in the second half of the 1940s and in the early 1950s. Reports compiled by these Soviet embassies were in turn based largely on information gathered from consuls, who kept close contacts with local leadership in Eastern Bloc countries. These reports would make their way up to the Central Committee, and they documented the most signifi cant issues pertaining to the functioning of a state, the situation within communist elite milieus, but also the general mood of society, the situation in the academy, in culture, and in intellectual life. The embassy of the USSR in Poland, moreover, was assigned the task of strictly monitoring the book market and of compiling a quarterly list of history books recommended for translation into Russian.
A key source of information on the subject of the general situation in Eastern Bloc countries were the reports of Soviet specialists. Their visits and research practicums (which oftentimes lasted several months) were designated in archival documentation as 'consultations:' they monitored and reported on the process of organizing the school system and curricula, on higher education, on departments and divisions in universities. Indeed, Soviet lecturers carried out entire series of lectures at these universities while they were gathering information.
During their stays at various kinds of academic and research institutions, which often lasted many months, Soviet consultants would make sure to establish and confi rm the plans for their assignments at the Soviet embassy. Reports originating from conversations carried out between people from research institutes and members of these Soviet delegations would fi rst make their way to the Soviet embassy, and it was the ambassador himself who would send them on to Moscow. Part of the materials passed through the Fourth European Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the CC CPSU, where notes were, in turn, sent to the proper administrative cells: fi rst to the Department of Science and the Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries. In the fi rst place, however, they were received by members of the Politburo responsible for sending them off onto their correct administrative channels.
The set of persons in the Kremlin responsible for making decisions on issues related to academic research changed from year to year. Without a doubt the most infl uential decision-maker in questions of science and ideology -and in particular humanities -was Mikhail Suslov, who, from the second half of the 1940s onward, began to acquire an evergreater role in the Kremlin's Olympus. Of course, Suslov did not personally deal with every individual decision; instead delegating their resolution to lower-ranking Party dignitaries.
In accordance with 'Kremlin Kitchen' rules, all projects were at fi rst to undergo extensive expert analysis; from multiple Departments if the project in question dealt with a broader range of issues. Issues related to the academic research were usually examined by the Department of Science (in its many forms and incarnations). Issues pertaining to academic research in 'people's democracies' were often solved in cooperation with the department dealing with the 'socialist community.' Issues having a uniquely sensitive political character, for their part, would also have to include the Department of Ideology. After 1958, a large portion of issues relating to political education came to be resolved within the Ideological Commission. This was especially the case with the historical sciences.
The sheer volume of information fl owing to various departments of the Central Committee was regularly worked through on the administrative level of sections and groups. If a given issue demanded further elaboration, the expert testimony of specialists in the given fi eld would be sought out. Various so-called consultancy groups functioned within these above-mentioned departments. These were composed of specialists in a given fi eld, usually researchers employed by academic and research institutions, who additionally provided specialist information and advice to Party dignitaries.
The majority of decisions were made on the basis of so-called zapiski, meaning memos originating from various departments of the CC CPSU, which oftentimes contained ready provisions for projects. These decisions fell into one of two possible forms. On the one hand, they were individual 'resolutions' (postanovleniya) of the CC CPSU, shared resolutions of the CC and the Council of Ministers of the USSR usually disseminated in print, resolutions of the Presidium, the Secretariat, or standing commissions. On the other hand -and not infrequently -there were 'decisions' (resheniya), made without being discussed at meetings, oftentimes in a fairly arbitrary manner. Moreover, issues were sometimes resolved by means of a so-called 'agreement' (oprosom) of individual secretaries, bypassing in this way the formal decision-making processes of the Politburo, Presidium, or Secretariat. 29 The process of implementing decisions was likewise very complex. The overall atmosphere of secrecy surrounding the centers of power meant that even the offi cial press never gave the names of individual departments, writing instead only generally, about a resolution of 'a department of the Central Committee.' Decisions were disseminated through a variety of channels. One of these was the Soviet embassy in Warsaw, Prague, or Sofi a. The ambassador or a lower-ranking diplomat would call the person in question in for a conversation and in the meantime inform them of the decision. In issues demanding wide-ranging discretion made use of other channels of information fl ow, sometimes even bypassing the local Soviet embassy.
'Archival' Politics and Shared Projects
The project of building the Kremlin's vision of its historical relations with other countries could not have existed without a specifi c political approach, one that we could call 'archival' politics. It goes without saying that both the archive and the politics emerging from its instrumentalization belonged to but one of many mechanisms for controlling the USSR's relationships with its neighbors. This was especially the case with Poland, whose history had for centuries been inextricably linked with its eastern neighbor. Manipulating archival resources, making specifi c sets of materials available only to researchers who were implementing political orders, freely juggling various 'corrected' sources without permitting their independent verifi cation -these were just some of the manifestations of Moscow's politics of history.
In addition to the retention of strict control over access to archival materials, an equally important part of these politics involved determining the acceptable themes and scopes of research that could be carried out on the basis of documents assembled in the archives of the USSR. The relative opening of the Soviet archives after 1956 -an opening only within the bounds of the existing political regime, to be sure -allowed not only Eastern Bloc researchers, but also researchers from the West limited access to the Soviet archives.
Nevertheless, these were very dangerous expeditions for Western researchers who not infrequently could fi nd themselves accused of 'espionage.' By way of example here we can note the Yale Sovietologist Frederick Barghoorn, or Edward L. Keenan, an American historian studying Central Asia at the time. It was his fame and international renown that allowed him to conduct research undermining the authenticity of two sources fundamental to Russian history and historical myth: the 16 th century letters of Ivan the Terrible to Knyaz Andrey Kurbsky and relics of Old-Russian literature from the Kievan Rus' period. 30 For Keenan, who the KGB accused of 'discrediting the socialist system' and of 'propagating an American lifestyle and the capitalist system,' the whole affair ended with expulsion from the USSR and, fi nally, with a tenured position at Harvard. Nevertheless, acquiring the status of persona non grata in the USSR entailed losing the ability to carry out research in Soviet archives, which effectively led to him changing his focus to Modern Russia and Ruthenia. 31 Historians from Eastern Bloc countries were generally allowed access to archives in the USSR for projects that concerned labor movements and the communist movement. For the most part, their projects made use of materials from the 19 th century and, less frequently, from the fi rst half of the 20 th century. Apart from research concerning the labor movement broadly defi ned, other equally acceptable and important topics of archival research included the history of 'relations with democratic Russia' and 'national liberation movements.' I can draw several conclusions from analyses conducted on CC CPSU archival documents that were given access to historians from 'people's democracies.' Decisions made by Soviet decision-makers to allow even limited access to archival materials were all made on the basis of very similar motivations. Very generally, I can say that access was denied to any topics that could lead to even a slight shade of doubt concerning the 'progressive' politics of Russia or the USSR with regard to these countries. Thus, historians were barred from accessing any materials or documents that represented the politics of early Russia in a negative light.
From the mid 1950s, a diverse host of research propositions for cooperative historical work dealing with the region then comprised of 'people's democracies' began. An-tonín Novotný, a Czechoslovak communist leader, put forward one particularly ambitious project. He proposed a joint research project dealing with the 'development of capitalism in Austria-Hungary,' which was to include historians from the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Austria, and Romania. In September, 1954 , Novotný submitted his proposal to the Soviet ambassador in Prague, Nikolay Firyubin, for transmission to the CC CPSU. When this proposal arrived in Moscow, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Nikolay Zorin immediately deposited the proposal in the hands of CC CPSU Presidium member Mikhail Suslov.
However, the Central Committee arrived at a negative decision, citing the 'inexpediency of assembling an editorial collegium in a situation in which the content of specifi c chapters, written by historians from other countries, would remain unknown.' This decision was confi rmed by Secretaries of the CC CPSU Mikhail Suslov, Pyotr Pospelov, and Nikolay Shatalin. The entire affair was fi nalized by expressing this decision to Novotný, who happened to be in Moscow at the time. 32 In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, several editorial boards were assembled in the USSR which were to work with selected historians from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria to analyze documents collected in Soviet archives and to publish edited collections of documents concerning the history of Polish-Soviet relations 33 , Czechoslovak-Soviet relations, 34 and Bulgarian-Soviet relations. 35 The selection and assortment of these documents was intended to help create the appropriate vision of Moscow's relations with these Slavic countries, as there was no room at the time for an objective presentation of the past.
As the analysis of documents from Russian archives testifi es, the Soviet side notably insisted on sharing the task of editing historical volumes, but in fact played a dominant role in determining the content of historical volumes, in selecting documents and in making fi nal editorial decisions. Oftentimes the most useful documents were kept far from the researchers who sought them. Whether while working on cooperative projects, or working on their individual queries in USSR archives, historians could only order microfi lms of those documents which were made available to them by the Soviet side. Operational materials dealing with the intelligence work of the Comintern, documentation of the Secretariat of the Politburo and of specifi c departments, which played a deciding role in understanding both the function and the role played by the Communist Party in USSR politics -these materials were only fi rst made available to historians in the early 1990s.
It is worthwhile to add a few words on the subject of the bureaucratic organs responsible for coordinating research activities carried out within the territories of the USSR and other Slavic countries, as well as for organizing cooperation between historians. What I have in mind here are the bilateral Commissions for Historians of Poland and the USSR, Czechoslovakia and the USSR, and Bulgaria and the USSR, the main task of which was to support historians by conducting archival queries or sponsoring academic exchange 32 RGANI f. 5, op. 17, d. 470, l. 214 programs. The Commission of Historians of Poland and the USSR was fi rst called into existence in Autumn 1965. The fi rst meeting of the Commission's leadership took place in Warsaw in 1967, during which time a plan of key historical issues was agreed upon. These included: the origin of Slavic peoples, relations between Polish and Russian revolutionaries, the meaning of the October revolution, and Polish-Soviet cooperation. 36 Other bilateral historical commissions established with countries from the socialist camp mainly came into being in the late 1960s and early 1970s -in the so-called early Brezhnev era. The Soviet-Czechoslovak Commission for Historians was called into existence in 1967, and in May of that year the fi rst organizational meeting of this Commission took place in Prague, where members adopted the 'Statute of the Commission for Historians of the USSR and the CzSSR.' Pyotr Pospielov, a former high-ranking Party dignitary and experienced manager of historical affairs, was elected head of the Soviet side of the Commission. 37 One year later, in June 1968 in Sofi a, Bulgaria, the fi rst meeting of the Commission for Historians of the USSR and Bulgaria took place, during which time an analogous statute was adopted. The head of the Soviet side of this Commission was member of the AS-USSR Yevgeny Zhukov. 38 Commissions for Historians were called into existence only with the express agreement of specifi c cells of the CC CPSU. They were intended to symbolize the deepening and strengthening of 'brotherly bonds and cooperation in the realm of historical sciences' between the USSR and specifi c countries from 'people's democracies.' On the other hand, they likewise served as mechanisms of further control over topics and research trajectories within these cooperative efforts.
Results obtained and conclusions:
It is important to emphasize that for the purpose of this article the research problem was narrowed down. It was not the aim of the present paper to determine the reaction of the above-mentioned countries to the Soviet politics of history. Determining the organizational, methodological and factual reception of Soviet solutions would pose a separate research question. It would be interesting to investigate the situation in this respect after the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia and the 1981 martial law in Poland. This would require interdisciplinary research, studying the work of local historians and the use of appropriate research methods and techniques. It is an interesting research trail awaiting an in-depth analysis.
The undertaken research on the institutional nature of the Soviet politics of history has demonstrated that the implementation of the Soviet system of political control over history -that is, the organizational and institutional decisions that Moscow attempted to 36 J. Szumski, Polityka, p. 342. 37 A. Nedorezov, 10 let raboty komissii sovetskikh i chekhoslovackikh istorikov, "Voprosy istorii" 1977 , no 8, p. 182. 38 A. Ulunyan, B. Matveev, Desyat' let raboty komissii istorikov SSSR i NRB, "Voprosy istorii" 1978 impose in Polish, Czechoslovakian, and Bulgarian realities proceeded extremely reluctantly and with varying intensity depending on the historical period and particular country. The scope and degree of interference into the affairs of local disciplines of history in abovementioned countries changed with the political situation and new tendencies in social and political life. Despite the fact that political pressure started to decline by the mid 1950s, certain areas and topics always remained beyond the reach of an objective scholarly analysis for political reasons. All Soviet party documents mentioned above demonstrate that the most exposed to manipulation and distortion was research on the history of the fi rst half of the 20 th century, especially the interwar period and World War II, where the patterns and visions articulated from above dominated. Falsifi cation of historical documents was a common phenomenon, along with the preparation of facts that would prove the 'progressiveness' of only one political option, would show 'friendship' and 'cooperation' of the 'democratic' forces selected from above, etc.
Historical studies on the specifi cally recognized 'labor movement' on Polish, Czechoslovakian, and Bulgarian territories, and the history of uprisings for independence were monopolized by politically engaged Party historians that were associated with various institutions of educational and ideological nature and additionally were vigilantly observed by Party authorities in Moscow.
The monopoly on offi cial historical description of the history of the Slavic countries of the Eastern Bloc was somewhat broken in the mid 1950s. There were, then, certain discrepancies between the canon of Soviet historical discipline and opinions especially of the Polish and Czechoslovakian historians who were close to decision-making circles. Moscow agreed with the existence of a version of Polish history that slightly differed from the Soviet canon. Methods and techniques of control evolved gradually from direct intervention to more subtle actions, while direct intervention was used only as a last resort in cases of clear violation of prescribed historical interpretation.
The undertaken research has also shown that over time the function of ideological control of history was transferred to Party inspectors from those countries who worked to prevent the emergence of undesirable -from the ideological point of view -studies and research related to historic events with obvious patriotic and often anti-Russian sentiments.
The Old Square in Moscow inspired and subsequently oversaw the realization of joint academic projects, provided guidelines on how to research and interpret historic events, thus implementing its historical policy in accordance with the interests of the state and Communist Party of the USSR. An important part of this policy was to determine, in agreement with the 'leading' historical institutions in the USSR, the topics and areas of Polish-Russian, Czechoslovakian-Russian and Bulgarian-Russian relations research that had to be based on the documents stored in the USSR archives.
Paradoxically, Moscow's efforts to be the main censor and oracle in the evaluation of history of the Slavic countries often led to results opposite to what had been intended. For example, the emerging volumes of source materials, including the collections of documents covering the history of the January Uprising (1863), became the foundation of Polish historical studies that relied on national tradition and emphasized the motive of struggles for independence. The evaluation of cooperation with Moscow within this project can no longer be reduced to a mere imposed ideological canon, and in this sense the intentions of the Old Square ideologues obviously failed.
Nowadays scholars conducting their research in the Soviet studies face numerous restrictions on access to primary sources preserved in Russian archives. Many of those valuable sources are still undisclosed, which does not allow for a comprehensive description of the complicated relations between history and politics in Central and Eastern Europe. This kind of research should be conducted, not only in the form of further work with the archives, but also in close cooperation with scholars from other academic fi elds and different countries, specializing in the Soviet studies, including contemporary history, historiography and the history of ideas.
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Archival sources
historią postępowało opornie i z różnym natężeniem, zależnym od okresu i kraju. Zakres i stopień wpływu na nauki historyczne w wymienionych krajach zmieniał się wraz z sytuacją polityczną oraz nowymi trendami w życiu społecznym i politycznym. Działania wobec historii krajów słowiańskich były sankcjonowane przez KPZR i wprowadzane zgodnie z interesami państwa i Partii. Kreml inspirował, a następnie nadzorował realizację wspólnych projektów badawczych, zapewniał wskazówki, jak należy badać i interpretować wydarzenia historyczne, ustanawiając w ten sposób istotny element swojej "polityki historycznej".
